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Jeffrey S. Lubbers*
I am honored to be asked to contribute to this memorial compendium
dedicated to Professor Sowa Toshifumi. As an Administrative Law Professor
myself who has had the good fortune to spend 10 summers in Kyoto teach-
ing ei-bei at Ritsumeikan University School of Law, I was early-on introduced
to Sowa-sensei at Kwansei Gakuin University. He（and his wife）, along with
his former student and now Doshisha Professor Kotani Mari, have been
great friends to me, bringing me into their circle of his devoted former stu-
dents for various activities and trips around the Kansai area. I have learned
from them just how great of a scholar and teacher he is and have seen for
myself how loyal he is to his friends and students.
I know that one of his main scholarly interests is the administrative law
enforcement system in Japan. I also know that he began his research career
studying judicial control of administrative discretion in economic regulation,
and wrote his dissertation on the subject of investigations by the u.s. Federal
Trade Commission. Since then he has expanded his interest in how civil
money penalties are assessed and in the possibilities of more collaborative
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methods of enforcement and governance.
With that in mind, I thought I would write about the u.s. federal govern-
ment’s approach to administrative enforcement, and some of the interesting
issues that have arisen in that arena. It is one that is somewhat neglected in
American legal scholars
（１）
hip. Many of us write about how administrative
regulations are promulgated and how they are challenged in court, but with-
out fair and efficient enforcement procedures, the best substantive laws and
regulations would lose their power to create a well-ordered society.
The U.S. Administrative Procedure Act（APA）, enacted in 19
（２）
46, provides
requirements for our administrative agencies to follow in issuing regulations
and adjudicative orders, and it contains a set of ground rules for courts to
apply when they review agency action, but the Act says very little of conse-
quence about enforcement. The only provision in the APA concerning
agency sanctions is section 558, which says so little that it is routinely ig-
nored in u.s. Administrative Law courses. Its two relevant sentences are:
（b）A sanction may not be imposed or a substantive rule or order is-
sued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as author-
ized by law, and
（c）****Except in cases of willfulness or those in which public health,
interest, or safety requires otherwise, the withdrawal, suspension,
（１） A classic political science volume focusing on enforcement is EUGENE
BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK : THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS（1982）.
（２） Pub. L. No. 79404, 60 Stat. 237（1946）（codified as amended in §§ 551
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revocation, or annulment of a license is lawful only if, before the insti-
tution of agency proceedings therefor, the licensee has been given—
（1）notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which
may warrant the action; and




Those sections simply make clear that before an agency can impose a
sanction, it must be authorized by Congress to do so, acting within its juris-
diction, and that, except in emergency circumstances, before an agency can
take away a federal license, the license-holder must be given adequate notice
and an opportunity to comply with all of its conditions. The Act, thus, says
little or nothing about limitations on agency powers to conduct investiga-
tions or inspections, the forum for any enforcement proceedings, the differ-
ence between criminal and civil penalties, the range of civil money penalties,
where collected money penalties are deposited, the role of juries, double
jeopardy considerations, etc. Instead, most of those issues have become con-
stitutional law questions, with the APA fleshing out some of those doctrines
or pointing the way towards implementing some of the constitutional norms.
This chapter endeavors to provide a concise description of the U.S. federal
administrative enforcement process, not because I think it is a model that
other countries should adopt, but because it might be instructive to readers
of this volume since（for reasons we all know）Japan’s Constitution has
many similar attributes to ours. I also hope it might be interesting to Sowa-
（３） 5 U.S.C. § 558（c）.
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sensei, though he doubtless already knows much of what I am about to de-
scribe.
The Growth of the “Administrative State”
I will return to the APA and the post-1946 growth of the executive branch
and the 1970s expansion of health, safety and environmental regulation, but
what about the 150 years before the enactment of the APA? Our Executive
Branch was quite small before the Civil War, and, even at the end of the
Nineteenth Century, only comprised eight departme
（４）
nts and several free-
standing agencies, notably the Civil Service Commission created by the
Pendleton Act of 18
（５）
83, and the Interstate Commerce Commission（ICC）,
created by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 to regulate the railroads
—the first independent regulatory agency whose members could only be re-
moved by the President for ca
（６）
use.
But with the advent of the Twentieth Century, the modern “Administrative
（４） The Departments of Agriculture, the Interior, Justice, Navy, Post Office,
State, Treasury and War. There was also a non-cabinet Department of Labor,
created in 1888 but given independent cabinet status in 1913. See JERRY L.
MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION—THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 240 and n.76（2012）.
（５） See U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, BIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEAL—
A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 20608（2003）, available at http ://
archive.opm.gov/BiographyofAnIdeal/PDF/BiographyOfAnIdeal.pdf.
（６） Originally the Commission was placed in the Department of the Interior,
but two years later “the Secretary’s authority over the commission was elimi-
nated by statute and the commission became functionally independent of the
executive branch.” Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Prac-
tice : The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN.
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State” began to eme
（７）
rge. The 1906 Hepburn Act gave the ICC rate-making
authority, “making it a very powerful agency. In 1913, President Wilson
signed the Federal Reserve Act, which required all national banks to join the
Federal Reserve System, which in turn was overseen by a Board of Gov-
ern
（８）
ors. In 1916, a piece of social legislation was enacted creating the U.S.
Employees’ Compensation Commission（USEC）to administer workers’
compensation benefits for civil employees of the United States suffering per-
sonal injuries while in the performance of official dut
（９）
ies. Congress created
other new free-standing regulatory agencies such as the Federal Trade Com-
mission in 19
（10）
14, and the Federal Radio Commission in 19
（11）
27, with very broad
（７） See DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE : THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 19001940（2014）.
（８） At first, the Secretary of the Treasury chaired the Board, but this was
changed in 1935. See the Board of Governors’ home page at http ://www.fed-
eralreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/boardmembership.htm. For more
on the experimentation in the Nineteenth Century with national banks, see
Mashaw, supra note 3, at ch. 9, 156174. The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency had been created within the Department of the Treasury in 1863,
see id. at 242.
（９） See the description in the U.S. Government Organization Manual
（1945）, available at http ://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ATO/USGM/USECC.
html. The USEC’s jurisdiction was broadened in 1927 to include administra-
tion of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, which
provided workers’ compensation benefits for employees in private enterprise
while engaged in maritime employment on navigable waters of the United
States.
（10） See the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717. Section 5 con-
tained the broad delegation that the FTC was charged with enforcing : “Un-
fair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.”（now
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45（a）（1）（2012））. For a legislative history of the Act,
論
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delegations. To address the Great Depression many new financial regulatory
agencies were crea
（12）
ted, along with the Federal Power Commission in 19
（13）
30,
the powerful but short-lived National Recovery Administration（NRA）in
1933, the National Labor Relations Board in 19
（14）
35, and the United States
Maritime Commission in 19
（15）
36.
see Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 27 B.C. L. REV. 227（1980）.
（11） See the Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69632, 44 Stat. 1162, which cre-
ated a Federal Radio Commission in section 3 and propounded the “public
interest, convenience or necessity” standard for regulation in section 4. In
1934, the Act was superseded by the Communications Act, which replaced
the Federal Radio Commission with the Federal Communications Commis-
sion. Pub. L. No. 416, June 19, 1934, 73d Cong.
（12） These included the Federal Home Loan Bank Board（1932）; Farm
Credit Administration and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation（1933）;
Securities and Exchange Commission（SEC）and Federal Credit Union
Board（1934）.
（13） The Commission was actually created in 1920 to coordinate federal
hydroelectric projects, but it was under the joint administration of the Secre-
taries of War, Interior, and Agriculture. The version created in 1930 was a
classic independent regulatory commission. In 1977 the FPC became the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See History of FERC, http ://www.
ferc.gov/students/ferc/history.asp.
（14） National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 449, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151169.
（15） According to the Federal Maritime Commission’s［FMC’s］website :
In 1920, Congress passed the Merchant Marine Act, which charged
the United States Shipping Board with monitoring and responding to
foreign laws, regulations, or practices that create conditions unfavor-
able to shipping in the foreign trade.
In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an executive order
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At first, Congress and the Supreme Court showed skepticism about this
growth. In 1894 the Supreme Court declared the income tax unconstitu-
tio
（16）
nal, a decision that was ultimately addressed in 1913 by the ratification
of the Sixteenth Amendment. The Court struck down two delegations to the
NRA in 19
（17）
35, causing it to stop operating, and Congress passed, and came
close to overriding President Franklin Roosevelt’s veto of, the Walter-Logan
b
（18）
ill, which would have subjected administrative agencies to formal hearings
in their rulemakings and in response to petitions to revise rules ; required
them to use three-person panels in adjudications ; and made their actions
subject to extensive judicial rev
（19）
iew.
DuringWorld War II, the military agencies were expanded, and soon after-
U.S. Shipping Board Bureau in the Department of Commerce. In
1936, Congress separated the Board from the Commerce Depart-
ment, creating the United States Maritime Commission. . . . In 1950,
the regulatory programs of the United States Maritime Commission
were transferred to the Federal Maritime Board at the Department
of Commerce, where they resided until the FMC’s creation in 1961.
Https ://www.fmc.gov/about-the-fmc/our-history.
（16） Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429（1895）, aff ’d on
rehrg., 158 U.S. 601（1895）.
（17） A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495（1935）, Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388（1935）.
（18） See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise : The Administrative Proce-
dure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U.L. REV. 1557, 15931632
（1996）（describing the legislative action on the Walter-Logan bill）. The vote
to override the veto in the House was 153 to 127, or 34 votes short. Id. at
1630.
（19） See PETER WOLL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE INFORMAL PROCESS, 1819
（1963）（describing the bill as an “extreme attempt on the part of the legal
profession to judicialize administrative procedure”）. Id. at 19.
論
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wards Congress enacted the APA, which provided for procedural limits on
agency action, but also implicitly recognized agency rulemaking and adjudi-
cative po
（20）
wer. Since 1950, Congress created seven of the current fifteen de-
partments and many new regulatory agencies, some of which, like the De-
partments of Transportation and Homeland Security and the Environmental
Protection Agency, have broad regulatory power.
Several key Supreme Court decisions have stimulated the growth of
agency power. An early one was the 1932 decision of Crowell v. Ben
（21）
son,
which upheld Congress’s ability to delegate adjudicative power to the US
（22）
EC.
That was followed closely by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States in 19
（23）
35,
which, in effect, recognized Congress’s power to create independent agen-
cies. After the passage of the APA, the Court enhanced the authority of
agency administrative law judges（ALJs）（then called “hearing examiners”）
in Universal Camera Corp. v. NL
（24）
RB and Butz v. Econom
（25）
ou.
（20） See generally Shepherd, supra note 18.
（21） 285 U.S. 22（1932）.
（22） In so doing, the Court distinguished cases involving matters of “public
rights” in which the government and private persons were opposing parties,
and matters of “private rights” where two private parties were opposed. The
Court reasoned that because Congress could assign public rights disputes
to itself or to executive officers, it could also assign them to administrative
tribunals like the USEC. However, the USEC essentially was a referee be-
tween a private employer and employee in the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers context so that distinction did not apply. Nevertheless, the Court
upheld the delegation because it found that Article III courts had the power
to independently review all issues of law and “questions of constitutional and
jurisdictional fact.” See MICHAEL ASIMOW AND RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 457（5th ed. 2020）.
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A series of cases sharply limited the non-delegation doctrine, ruling that
delegations were proper as long as the legislation passed by Congress con-
tained an “intelligible principle” to be followed by the agency in its regu-
lati
（26）
ons. Occasional protests to this low bar were he
（27）
ard, but Justice Scalia
seemed to have resignedly accepted it in the 2001 case of American Trucking
Associationswhen the Court rebuffed an attempt by the D.C. Circuit to revive
the doctr
（28）
ine. This may be changing, however, as members of the increas-




（24） 340 U.S. 474（1951）（requiring reviewing courts to consider the initial
decisions of hearing examiners as part of the record in reviewing agency fi-
nal orders）.
（25） 438 U.S. 478, 513（1977）（“There can be little doubt that the role of the
modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge . . . is ‘function-
ally comparable’ to that of a judge.”）.
（26） This test actually originated in the 1928 case of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409（1928）（“If Congress shall lay down by leg-
islative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbid-
den delegation of legislative power.”）. Other than the two decisions involving
the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1935, supra note 16, the Court has
never struck down an Act of Congress on non-delegation grounds.
（27） See Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 671（1980）（Rehnquist, J. concurring in the judgment, but finding a vio-
lation of the non-delegation doctrine）.
（28） Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 47475（2001）（“In
short, we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regard-
ing the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those exe-
cuting or applying the law.’”）（quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 416（1989）（Scalia, J., dissenting））.
（29） See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131（2019）（Gorsuch, J.,
論
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Two Models of Civil Money Penalty Statutes
Regardless of whether the non-delegation doctrine is revived, Congress
has authorized most U.S. regulatory agencies to levy sanctions for violations
of their statutes and regulations, and such sanctioning authority often in-
cludes the power to seek civil money penalties. The traditional civil money
penalty statute enacted by Congress required that the enforcing agency re-
sort to a court for collection. Under that scheme, the agency would notify the
respondent of a violation. There would be some settlement negotiation, and
if that failed, the agency would assess a penalty. If the respondent didn’t pay,
the agency would have to go through the Department of Justice（DOJ）, nor-
mally meaning the local U.S. Attorney, and seek to collect in the appropriate
U.S. District Court. In that proceeding, the respondent would have the right
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendm
（30）
ent. Needless to say, this was cum-
bersome, and many U.S. Attorneys did not want to prosecute cases that
would require them to learn a whole new body of regulatory law and go
through a time-consuming trial, potentially against a locally powerful defen-
dant, all for a relatively small penalty that would flow into the general treas-
ury.
The Administrative Conference of the U.S.（ACUS）looked at this prob-
lem in 1972 and suggested a different model—the “administrative imposition
model”—in which the agency’s civil penalty statute would provide that the
agency could assess the penalty itself, but only after giving respondents a
dissenting）.
（30） U.S. CONST. AMEND. VII（providing a right to a jury trial in all suits at
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right to a full APA hearing before one of its A
（31）
LJs. After that（and any agency
appellate rev
（32）
iew）, the respondent could seek judicial review in the court of
appeals—but only on the record of the agency proceeding—not a trial de
novo. This model began to be accepted by Congress, and numerous statutes
began to incorporate it. In 1978, in the Atlas Roofing c
（33）
ase, a respondent chal-
lenged this procedure, claiming it violated his right to a jury trial, but the
Supreme Court rejected that claim because these statutory programs in-
volved “public rights” not “private rights.” But the Court later said that a jury
trial right still obtains when a traditional court-collection statute like the
Clean Water Act is invo
（34）
ked.
ACUS followed up with a study and recommendation that showed the ex-
tent of the growth of civil money penalties and also focused on how agencies
should craft their civil money penalty polic
（35）
ies. It recommended that agen-
（31） Administrative. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 726, “Civil Money
Penalties as a Sanction,” 38 Fed, Reg. 19,792（July 23, 1973）, available at
https ://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/72-6.pdf.
（32） For information on the variety of agency appellate systems, see
Christopher J. Walker and Matthew Lee Wiener, Agency Appellate Systems,
Final Report to the Administrative Conference of the U.S.,（Dec. 14, 2020）,
available at https ://www.acus.gov/report/final-report-agency-appellate-sys-
tems.
（33） Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n,
430 U.S. 442（1977）.
（34） See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412（1987）.
（35） Administrative. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 793, “Agency As-
sessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties,” 44 Fed. Reg. 38,824（ July
3, 1979）, available at https ://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
79-3.pdf. The underlying report found that of the 348 statutory civil penalties
administered by agencies, in 141 “Congress has expressly conferred upon
論
説
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cies with civil money penalty authority develop and publish policies for the
assessment of penalties, including aggravating and mitigating factors. It also
emphasized that “A penalty intended to deter or influence economic behav-
ior should, at a minimum, be designed to remove the economic benefit of the
illegal activity, taking into account the documented benefit and the likeli-
hood of escaping detect
（36）
ion.” This, of course, assumes that the agency keeps
the penalty within the boundaries set by statute. Sometimes a statute pro-
vides direction as to the factors the agency should consider when it deter-
mines the amount of the pena
（37）
lty.
But all this is not to say that the administrative imposition model is uncon-
troversial. The well-heeled lawyers who practice before the Securities and
Exchange Commission（SEC）have long claimed that this model is unfair
—because they think it is a conflict of interest for agency ALJs to hear
agency “prosecutions.” Interestingly, the SEC is one of the few agencies that
has statutory authority to choose which model to
（38）
use. But this unfairness
claim has not been accepted by the courts, which recognize that the APA’s
formal（trial-type）adjudication procedures provide sufficient due process
even for significant civil money penalties. I will discuss these procedures
more below.
an administrative agency an authority to ‘assess’ the penalty.” Colin S Diver,
The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by Federal Administra-
tive Agencies, 79 COLUM L. REV. 1435, 1441（1979）, available at https ://www.
acus.gov/report/project-report-recommendation-79-3.
（36） ACUS Recommendation 793, para. 1.
（37） See, e.g., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413（e）.
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The Line between Criminal and Civil Penalties
Many statutes include both civil and criminal penalties—the Occupational
Safety and Health Act for example. But criminal penalties not only involve
a higher burden of proof, and a much more difficult trial, the agency also
must persuade DOJ to bring the criminal prosecution. Therefore, the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration（OSHA）generally reserves its
criminal charges for cases where the violation led to a fatality, but otherwise
brings an administrative civil money penalty case. Nevertheless, Congress




Indeed, one of the weak points in U.S. administrative law is the rather
fuzzy distinction between civil and criminal penalties. One place this mani-
fests itself, given that many statutes have both criminal and civil penalties,
is whether a civil penalty enforcement action followed by a criminal prosecu-
tion for the same wrongdoing（or vice versa）violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendm
（40）
ent. This issue can arise in three ways, bearing
in mind the government’s higher burden of proof in criminal cases:（1）the
agency conducts a civil penalty action first, which is successful, then asks
（39） See D.K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administra-
tive Law, 7 J. OF LAW, ECON. & POLICY 657（2011）. In 2013, ACUS organized




（40） U.S. CONST. AMEND XIV（providing that “nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”）.
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DOJ to seek a criminal penalty;（2）the agency（through DOJ）achieves a
criminal conviction first, then seeks a civil penalty ; or（3）the agency
（through DOJ）fails to achieve a criminal conviction first, but nonetheless
seeks a civil penalty. Note that if the agency first attempted（unsuccessfully）
to impose a civil penalty, it would not likely try for a criminal conviction.
In the case of United States v. Hal
（41）
per, the Supreme Court unanimously
said the Double Jeopardy Clause could be violated if the subsequent civil
penalty that followed a criminal conviction was so large as to be punitive.
Halper was a manager of a medical service provider who had been con-
victed, fined $5,000, and imprisoned for two years for having submitted 65
false claims for Medicare reimbursement. The government then sought
over $130,000 in the 65 civil penalty counts—despite the fact that the defen-
dant had only overcharged the government by a total of $585. The Supreme
Court said the penalty amount was so disproportionate as to be punishment,
and held that under the Double Jeopardy clause, the government could only
sue for remedial purposes—for actual damages and costs—once it had also
sought criminal punishment. The current Chief Justice of the United States,
John Roberts, represented Halper in that case in the first case he argued be-
fore the Supreme Court as a private attorney.
The result in Halper was of great concern to the government because it
seemed to say that it was impossible for an agency to use both criminal pen-
alties and civil penalties against the same defendant. And that would mean
that the government would be afraid to seek criminal prosecutions for regu-
latory violations for fear of losing, and thereby foreclosing any sanction.
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So only eight years later in Hudson v. United Sta
（42）
tes, the Supreme Court
took this issue up again and this time eight of the nine Justices disavowed
the unanimous reasoning of Halper. In Hudson, the government first im-
posed civil money penalties and administrative debarment on several bank
officers. The civil penalties were originally assessed at $100,000 against one
officer and $50,000 against two other officers. These were later negotiated
into consent agreements of between $12,500 and $16,500. Then the bank of-
ficers were criminally indicted for the same conduct. When the indictments
were challenged on double jeopardy grounds, the district court denied the
officers’ motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit said the debarment
sanction did not raise double jeopardy concerns, but the money penalty
might, and remanded the case. The district court then granted the motion
to dismiss. This time the government appealed, and the Tenth Circuit re-
versed on the grounds that under Halper, the civil fines were not dispropor-
tionate. The Supreme Court affirmed, but in doing so, jettisoned the Halper
analysis.
The majority opinion ruled that unless the “statute on its face” clearly
shows that both penalties are criminal in nature, the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apply. It also referenced a series of factors derived from an
earlier case, Kennedy v. Mendoza–Marti
（43）
nez, for determining “whether a par-
ticular punishment is criminal or ci
（44）
vil.” These factors are:
（1）“［w］hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
（42） 522 U.S. 93（1997）.
（43） 372 U.S. 144（1963）.
（44） Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99.
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straint”;（2）“whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment”;（3）“whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter”;
（4）“whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence”;（5）“whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime”;（6）“whether an alternative pur-
pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and





Agencies have to gather a lot of information—either in connection with
their general oversight of an industry or in connection with a particular en-
forcement action. This raises a number of legal issues.
Although the APA says little about this, some provisions in our Bill of
Rig
（46）
hts apply to agency civil investigations and inspections, but in a more lim-
ited way than they do to criminal investigations. For example, the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies,
but the requirements are loosened. As a general rule, a search warrant is re-
quired for an administrative inspection of a home or non-public area. So, for
example, would OSHA be required to obtain a search warrant before it sends
an inspector to a grocery store’s meat cutting department? Not necessarily;
the store probably would let him in without one. If, however, the store did
not consent to the inspection, the agency would have to obtain a warrant, ab-
（45） Id. at 99100, citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 16869.
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sent an emergency situat
（47）
ion. But OSHA can get its warrant from a judge in
an ex parte process, and the agency need not show a probable violation, only
an inspection based on neutral criteria. But at least this “tends to prevent in-
spections motivated by harassment or other improper purpo
（48）
ses.”
On the other hand, even this unburdensome process does not apply to in-
spections of “pervasively regulated businesses.” The Supreme Court has
identified four such industries in its cases, liquor sales, firearms dealing,
mining, and running an automobile junky
（49）
ard. In the last case the Court sug-
gested that the test is whether the industry could present a “clear and signifi-
cant threat to the public welf
（50）
are.” Moreover, some agencies, such as the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission will only grant licenses conditioned on allow-
ing warrantless inspections.
Subpoenas
Related to investigations, is an agency’s ability to compel production of in-
formation though a subpoena. There are some limits. The first is that the
agency must have statutory authority. The APA itself does not authorize
agency subpoena power, but it does contain two applicable provisions : sec-
tion 556（c）gives ALJs power to “issue subpenas authorized by l
（51）
aw,” and sec-
（47） See Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. 307（1978）. See also OSHA Fact
Sheet on inspections, https ://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/
factsheet-inspections.pdf.
（48） Asimow & Levin, supra note 22, at 176.
（49） This list comes from City of Los Angeles, Calif., v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 424
（2015）（declining to allow a warrantless seizure of hotel registration re-
cords）.
（50） New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 709（1987）.
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tion 555（d）states:
Agency subpenas authorized by law shall be issued to a party on re-
quest and, when required by rules of procedure, on a statement or
showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence
sought. On contest, the court shall sustain the subpena or similar
process or demand to the extent that it is found to be in accordance
with law. In a proceeding for enforcement, the court shall issue an or-
der requiring the appearance of the witness or the production of the
evidence or data within a reasonable time under penalty of punish-
ment for contempt in case of contumacious failure to com
（52）
ply.
In addition to the requirement that the agency have statutory authority to
issue subpoenas, a century-old Supreme Court case, ICC v. Brim
（53）
son, held
that it would violate due process for Congress to give agencies the power to
enforce their own subpoena by holding parties in contempt. In other words,
as the APA provision implies, agencies must go to court to enforce them, al-




（51） 5 U.S.C. § 556（c）. The codified APA uses the spelling “subpena.”
（52） 5 U.S.C. § 555（d）.
（53） 154 U.S. 447（1894）.
（54） The FBI was may issue “National Security Letters”（NSLs）to telephone
and internet companies, financial institutions, and credit agencies to obtain
customer records “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” USA PATRIOT
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When administrative subpoenas are contested, the courts give agencies
much leeway in enforcing them. There are some limited grounds for chal-
lenging them, such as lack of jurisdiction, too broad or burdensome, or issu-
ance in bad faith, but it is difficult to win these cases. The Supreme Court
has held that a subpoena should be enforced if the investigation is for “a law-
fully authorized purpose within the power of the［legislature］to command”
and the subpoenaed documents are “relevant” to the inqu
（55）
iry. More recently
in a federal tax investigation, the Court, in reviewing a challenge to an Inter-
nal Revenue Service subpoena, held that the taxpayer must make a “showing
of facts that give rise to a plausible inference of an improper motive” before
the district court can even allow discovery on such a cl
（56）
aim.
Some privileges may be invoked as defenses to agency demands for infor-
mation, testimony, or documents. For example, the attorney-client, marital,
doctor-patient, and therapist-patient privileges can be invoked just as they
can be in a civil or criminal court proceeding. The “work-product” privilege
can also be a defense to requests for information. But the biggest difference
between a criminal investigation and an administrative one is the reduced
scope of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. It ap-
plies in administrative cases, but with significant limitations. For example it
（codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861（2012））. In some circumstances
the FBI can prohibit recipients of NSLs from disclosing that they received
them. NSLs are judicially reviewable but the courts are very deferential. For
information and critical commentary on NSLs, see Electronic Frontier Foun-
dations, National Security Letters : FAQ, https ://www.eff.org/issues/na-
tional-security-letters/faq#1（last visited January 30, 2021）.
（55） Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186（1946）.
（56） United States v. Clarke, 573 U.S. 248（2014）.
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cannot be invoked by corporations. Nor may persons（e.g., corporate offi-
cers）called to give testimony refuse to testify entirely; they can only refuse
to answer specific questions, and unlike in the criminal trial context, the
agency can draw adverse inferences from a refusal to answer. Finally in an
administrative context, the privilege can be overcome by an offer of immu-
nity from criminal prosecution. With regard to documents, the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege can only be asserted by a person in possession of them（e.
g., not if an accountant has them）. Nor can the privilege be asserted if the
documents are required by statute to be maintai
（57）
ned, or if the documents
were voluntarily compiled（not produced by state compuls
（58）
ion）, unless the
mere act of keeping and producing them is itself incriminat
（59）
ing. Finally, the
privilege cannot be asserted if the documents are seized under a valid search
warrant. Thus it covers only the act of producing, under state compulsion,
papers that were not voluntarily prepared already nor required to be kept
by statute.
Rights to a Hearing—Either Administrative or Judicial
Under an old-style court collection penalty statute, the alleged violator has
the right to a full federal district court trial under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, with the option of seeking a jury trial. The APA hearing provided
in the administrative imposition model is nearly as formal, although it lacks
（57） Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1（1948）.
（58） United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605（1984）.
（59） Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39（1968）（Shapiro rule does not
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the jury trial option and it is presided over by an ALJ rather than a life-ten-
ured federal judge.
The latter process begins by the agency providing a notice of（1）the time,
place, and nature of the hearing;（2）the legal authority and jurisdiction un-
der which the hearing is to be held; and（3）the matters of fact and law that
are asser
（60）
ted. The agency must then give all parties the opportunity to pre-
sent facts, arguments, and offers of settlem
（61）
ent. An ALJ（a judicial officer
within agencies who is independent of the policymaking and enforcement
parts of the agency）then presides over the hear
（62）
ing. The ALJ has the normal
judicial authority to regulate the hear
（63）
ing and make the initial or recom-
mended decision in the c
（64）
ase. In addition, the APA provides for “separation
of functions,” meaning that staff engaged in investigation or prosecution may
not communicate with decisionmakers about a case while it is in progr
（65）
ess.
The formal rules of evidence do not apply in agency proceedings, and hear-
say evidence is normally allo
（66）
wed. Agencies often take “official notice” of
broad general facts, but they are required to allow a party to demonstrate




（60） 5 U.S.C. § 554（b）.
（61） 5 U.S.C. § 554（c）.
（62） 5 U.S.C. § 556（b）; the agency itself or one of the members of the colle-
gial body governing the agency may also preside.
（63） 5 U.S.C. § 556（c）.
（64） 5 U.S.C. § 557（b）. “Initial” decisions may become final if not appealed
or reviewed by the agency head ; “recommended” decisions must be
reviewed.
（65） 5 U.S.C. § 554（d）.
（66） 5 U.S.C. § 556（d）.
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Typically, the agency will also provide at least one and sometimes more
levels of appeal or review within the agency its
（68）
elf. Agencies, and agency
heads acting in a review capacity, are allowed to have a particular point of
view or general bias. Thus, for example, it is fully appropriate for a Federal
Trade Commission that is avowedly pro-competition to hear a case in which
it has charged a company with anti-competitive activ
（69）
ity. There are limits,
however, and courts will disqualify an adjudicator if the person has a specific,
personal bias, such as having pre-judged major issues of f
（70）
act, animus against
a litigant, or a personal interest in the outc
（71）
ome. And ex parte communica-




There are some other statutes that bear on agency enforcement. One, the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, provides a series of
special rights for “small entities”（primarily small businesses and small local
governments）charged with regulatory violati
（73）
ons. Agencies are directed to
（67） 5 U.S.C. § 556（d）.
（68） See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 557 and the Walker & Wiener report, supra note 32.
The agency may issue a rule stipulating that a party must exhaust adminis-
trative remedies before seeking judicial review. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S.
137（1993）.
（69） FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683（1948）.
（70） Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754（D.C. Cir. 1964）; the Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission made a speech that clearly indicated that he had
already decided central issues of fact in a case that was currently pending
before his agency.
（71） In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564（1973）, the Court concluded that the
composition of a state licensing agency was unacceptably biased as having
too substantial a pecuniary interest in the outcome.
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“establish a policy or . . . to provide for the reduction, and under appropriate
circumstances for the waiver, of civil penalties for violations of a statutory
or regulatory requirement by a small entity. Under appropriate circum-
stances, an agency may consider ability-to-pay in determining penalty assess-
ments on small entit
（74）
ies.” The Act does make clear that this lenience should
not be extended to entities that have been repeat offenders, have engaged
in willful or criminal conduct, or committed violations that pose serious
health, safety, or environmental thre
（75）
ats.
Judicial Review and Penalty Collection
But aside from these special provisions for enforcement actions against
“small entities,” once the agency has assessed a penalty under an administra-
tive imposition statute, any respondent would have a right to judicial review,
normally in the appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals, which would review the
agency decision on the administrative record（usually without allowing any
new evidence at that point）. The court would apply the standards of review
outlined in Section 706（2）of the A
（76）
PA and set aside the agency order if it
was found to have violated the Constitution, an applicable statute or proce-
dural requirement, or was not supported by substantial evidence. But the ap-
propriateness of the penalty amount itself, is reviewed on an abuse-of-discre-
tion standard, and it would likely be sustained if it were within the statutory
（73） Pub. L. 104121, title II, § 223, Mar. 29, 1996, 110 Stat. 862, codified at
5 U.S.C. § 601 note.
（74） Id., § 223（a）.
（75） Id., § 223（b）.
（76） 5 U.S.C. § 706（2）（AF）.
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Once all such judicial appeals were exhausted, the penalty would be sub-
ject to collection. If the respondent refused to pay at that point, the govern-
ment could bring a collection proceeding in federal district court and the de-
fendant would not be able to raise any additional defenses and would be sub-
ject to contempt of court, and possible jailing, if payment were not forthcom-
ing and the court determined that assets were available. But such proceed-
ings are rarely necessary.
Civil money penalties normally are paid directly into the U.S. Treasury’s
general fund and not to the agency its
（78）
elf. Occasionally, however, Congress
will specify another use of the monies. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 provides:
If, in any judicial or administrative action brought by the［Securities
and Exchange］Commission under the securities laws, the Commis-
sion obtains a civil penalty against any person for a violation of such
laws, or such person agrees, in settlement of any such action, to such
civil penalty, the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or
at the direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of
a disgorgement fund or other fund established for the benefit of the
victims of such violat
（79）
ion.
（77） See Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 186（1973）
（agency choice of sanction should be upheld unless “found to be “unwar-
ranted in law or without justification in fact”）.
（78） See the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3302（b）, requiring that
all monies “received” by the government be deposited in the General Treas-
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The Supreme Court had earlier upheld a provision of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act providing that money collected as civil penalties for employment
of child labor in violation of the Act must be returned to the Department of
Labor as reimbursement for amounts expended in determining the violation.
The Court said this “did not violate the Due Process Clause by creating an
impermissible risk of bias in the enforcement and administration of the Act,
since no government officials stood to profit from vigorous enforcement of
child labor provisions, there was no realistic possibility that［the］assistant
regional administrator’s judgment would be distorted by the prospect of in-
stitutional gain, and civil penalties actually collected under the section repre-
sented less than 1％ of［the agency’s］bud
（80）
get.”
Reviewability of Non-Enforcement Decisions
In the context of criminal prosecution, it is generally understood that
“prosecutorial discretion” precludes legal challenges to decisions by prose-
cutors to indict or not indict persons who might be involved in criminal be-
havior. While the reasons for it are understandable, this is not entirely a salu-
tary situation. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis recognized this in his classic
book, Discretionary Justice, in which he devoted one chapter to the problem
of selective enforcement and another to the need for “confining, structuring,
and confining the prosecuting po
（81）
wer.” Of course in many states and local
（79） Pub. L. No. 10724, § 308（a）, 116 Stat. 745, 784（codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7246）.
（80） Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238（1980）. The quotation is from the
Court’s synopsis.
（81） KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE : A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
（1969）chapters VI & VII.
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governments, chief prosecutors are elected and are therefore accountable
to the electorate.
This general acceptance of prosecutorial discretion has carried over to
federal agency decisions to bring or not bring an enforcement action. The
APA does provide that a reviewing court may “compel agency action unlaw-
fully withheld or unreasonably dela
（82）
yed.” However, in Heckler v. Chaney, the
Supreme Court held that an agency’s decision on a petition to initiate an en-




First, an agency decision not to enforce often involves a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its exper-
tise. Thus, the agency must not only assess whether a violation has
occurred, but whether agency resources are best spent on this viola-
tion or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts,
whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the
agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has
enough resources to undertake the action at all. An agency generally
cannot act against each technical violation of the statute it is charged
with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts to




（82） 5 U.S.C. § 706（1）.
（83） 470 U.S. 821（1985）（applying 5 U.S.C. § 701（a）（2））.












470（470） 法と政治 72巻 1号 （2021年 5月）
Moreover, in an another case, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to
an agency’s failure to take appropriate action to enforce a programmatic stat-
ute—protecting public lands from environmental harm caused by off-road
vehicles. The Court held that such suits could “proceed only where an
agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to t
（85）
ake.”
Hence, there is a presumption that the courts will not review an agency’s
decision not to take enforcement action. The Court said that this presump-
tion may be rebutted by showing that: the underlying statute either provides
a duty to enfo
（86）
rce or provides guidelines the agency must follow in enforce-
ment; the agency has simply refused to enforce the law; or the agency has
either based its refusal “to institute proceedings based solely on the belief
that it lacks jurisdiction” or adopted a policy that is “so extreme as to amount
to an abdication of its statutory responsibil
（87）
ity.”
If lawsuits are generally unavailable to challenge questionable acts of fed-
eral agency enforcement discretion, what is the solution? It is easy to say
what the solution is, but harder to achieve it. The solution is giving enough
discretion for inspectors and other enforcement officers to adjust their en-
forcement practices to the situation at hand while providing them with regu-
lations for them to enforce that are clear enough to provide predictability
and avoid inconsistent application and unfairness. As Bardach and Kagan
point out, regulated businesses want this kind of predictability, advocates of
stringent regulation want to close off loopholes, and even inspectors them-
（85） Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55（2004）.
（86） Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560（1975）.
（87） Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4（citing Adams v. Richardson, 480
F.2d 1159（D.C. Cir. 1973）（en banc）.
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selves like having precise regulations to invoke when undertaking their in-
specti
（88）
ons. The problem of course is finding the right balance and also draft-
ing regulations with optimal precis
（89）
ion.
The Influence of Politics
Finally, the influence of politics on enforcement cannot be igno
（90）
red. In the
United States, especially in recent years, we have see-sawed between conser-
vative and liberal administrations—and this has been reflected in enforce-
ment priorities and levels. Conservative administrations have emphasized
deregulation in the spheres of health, safety, environmental, and consumer
protection regulation as well as stricter regulation of immigration, while lib-
eral administrations have taken the opposite tack. Although there are no
centralized statistics of federal enforcement actions, there is plenty of anec-
dotal evidence. Environmental cases brought by the Department of Justice
fell sharply in the first two years of the Trump Administrat
（91）
ion, and the num-
ber of animal welfare citations dropped by 65 per c
（92）
ent. This sort of drastic
（88） Bardach & Kagan, supra note 1 at 3436.
（89） See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules,
93 YALE L.J. 65, 7274（1983）;
（90） For a recognition that there needs to be more scholarship about this is-
sue, see Jodi L. Short, The politics of regulatory enforcement and compliance :
Theorizing and operationalizing political influences, REGULATION AND
GOVERNANCE（2019）, available at https ://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/
10.1111/rego.12291.
（91） See Steven Mufson, “What happens when the government stops doing
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pendulum swing is not conducive to consistent enforcement.
Conclusion
An ordered society needs efficient enforcement procedures. A democratic
society needs fair procedures and accountable enforcers. The American
two-tiered system of providing heightened rights for criminal defendants
and lesser but still formal hearing rights for civil respondents is a sensible
one even though the distinction is sometimes difficult to delineate. Within
the civil enforcement system, the modern agency imposition system with
agency ALJ hearings, de novo judicial review of legal issues, and deferential
（“substantial evidence”）review of agency fact finding provides a good bal-
ance of fairness and efficiency.
The basic structure is sound, but its success depends on adequate re-
sources and a bi-partisan commitment to enough investigations, charges,
and sanctions to provide the necessary level of deterrence of illegal behavior
and the maintenance of the rule of law. These are the main challenges as
we continually retool the modern administrative state in the United States.
（92） See Karen Brulliard & William Wan, “Caged raccoons drooled in 100-de-
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Administrative Enforcement
in the United States
Jeffrey S. Lubbers
This contribution to Sowa-sensei’s tribute volume covers a topic that he
know a lot about—administrative enforcement in the United States. It at-
tempts to be a concise overview of legal issues pertaining to administrative
enforcement by U.S. federal agencies. The U.S. Administrative Procedure
Act, which provides detailed requirements for agency rulemaking and adju-
dication and for judicial review, says little about agency enforcement proce-
dures. Moreover, the robust constitutional restrictions in the Bill of Rights
applicable to criminal prosecutions apply only weakly to agency enforce-
ment actions. Nevertheless, the traditional statutes that required agencies
to go to court to seek civil money penalties did not work well. They were
gradually replaced by a system of agency imposition of penalties in which
respondents could defend themselves in formal agency adjudications, with
judicial review based on the administrative record created in that proceed-
ing. This system has proven to be more effective and efficient, but its ulti-
mate success is ultimately dependent on the dedication of sufficient staff
and budgets for the enforcing agencies, and on political support for the en-
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